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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Cynthia Evon Dent appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine. For the first time on appeal, 
Dent complains that an officer impermissibly commented on her right to silence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officers responded to Dent's home when Dent's mother requested a 
welfare check after she received text messages from Dent that Dent thought 
"people were out to get her, out to hurt her." (Trial Tr., p.156, L.2 - p.157, L.3.) 
Upon arriving at Dent's home, Officer Joel Woodward noted that Dent appeared 
to be under the influence of methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.159, Ls.12-21.) 
Dent was "describing/ paranoia" and "speaking rapidly." (Trial Tr., p.159, L.22, 
p.162, Ls.5-12.) While looking through Dent's residence, Officer Woodward 
located "two small ziplock style bags" in one of the bedrooms. (Trial Tr., p.165, 
Ls.6-7.) Both bags contained a "small amount" of what appeared to be 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.7-10.) Officer Woodward arrested Dent, 
and when he asked Dent if she had anything "illegal on her person ... that he 
needed to know about," Dent told him she had two methamphetamine pipes in 
her vagina. (State's Exhibit 2.) A subsequent search facilitated by Officer Sally 
Miller revealed that, rather than two methamphetamine pipes, Dent instead had 
one methamphetamine pipe and one toothbrush in her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.169, 
L.1 - p.170, L.1.) The glass methamphetamine pipe Dent removed from her 
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vagina tested positive for methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.169, L.14- p.170, L.1, 
p.217, Ls.1-17.) 
The state originally charged Dent with trafficking in methamphetamine 
and/or amphetamine, but later amended the charge to possession of 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.8-9, 17-18, 31-32.) Dent pied not guilty and the case 
proceeded to trial at which a jury found her guilty. (See R., pp.35-36, 58-68, 85-
88, 106-107.) The court imposed a unified four-year sentence with two years 
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Dent on probation. (R., pp.113-






















Dent states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether Officer Woodward's testimony commenting on Ms. Dent's 
decision to remain silent constitutes fundamental error? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Dent failed to carry her burden of showing fundamental error with respect to 





















Dent Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To Her Unpreserved 
Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
At trial, Officer Woodward testified that he "located two small ziplock style 
bags" in "one of the bedrooms" and that both bags appeared to contain a "small 
amount" of what he believed to be methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.6-10.) 
The prosecutor asked Officer Woodward whether he questioned Dent about 
"those baggies" and Officer Woodward testified that he did and Dent "[i]nitially 
stated she didn't ... know what they were." (Trial Tr., p.165, L.21 - p.166, L.1.) 
Officer Woodward then added: ''Thereafter, I had read her her Miranda rights 
and she didn't want to talk about them." (Trial Tr., p.166, Ls.2-3.) 
For the first time on appeal, Dent argues the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting from Officer Woodward testimony that "contained an 
improper comment on Ms. Dent's decision to remain silent." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.5.) Although Dent recognizes she did not preserve this issue by way of a 
timely objection below, she nevertheless contends review is proper - and 
reversal is necessary - because, she argues, the alleged misconduct constitutes 
fundamental error in violation of her rights under the "Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment [sic] of the federal Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution." (Id.) Dent's argument fails. Correct application of the law to the 
facts of this case shows Dent has failed to carry her burden of establishing 
fundamental error entitling her to reversal of her conviction. 
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B . Standard Of Review 
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection 
may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that 
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) 
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for 
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the 
error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court 
proceedings." kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
C. Dent Has Failed To Carry Her Burden Of Demonstrating Fundamental 
Error In Relation To Her Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
"The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as 
Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the 
right not to be compelled to testify against himself." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 
53, 60, 253 P.3d 727, 734 (2011) (citing U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Idaho 





















defendant the right to remain silent, they also prevent the prosecution from 
commenting at trial on the defendant's exercise of that right. ~ (citing Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965)). The right against self-incrimination 
embodied in the federal and state constitutions "is not absolute ... and applies 
only when the silence is used solely for the purpose of implying guilt." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814,821,965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998), quoted in Ellington, 151 
Idaho at 61, 253 P.3d at 735; accord State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 566, 300 
P.3d 1046, 1054 (2013). 
Citing Ellington, supra, and State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 33 P.3d 806 
(2014), Dent argues for the first time on appeal that the prosecutor violated her 
constitutional right to remain silent by eliciting the following testimony from 
Officer Woodward: "Thereafter, I had read her her Miranda rights and she didn't 
want to talk about [the baggies]." (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9 (quoting Trial Tr., 
p.166, Ls.2-3).) Dent has failed to carry her burden of establishing fundamental 
error in relation to the prosecutor's questioning of Officer Woodward because, 
contrary to Dent's assertions, the complained of testimony did not clearly violate 
her constitutional rights, nor is there any reasonable possibility that it affected the 
outcome of the trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
In order to establish the first two prongs of her fundamental error claim, 
Dent must demonstrate that the prosecutor not only elicited testimony 
concerning her post-Miranda silence, but that the prosecutor clearly did so for 
the impermissible purpose of implying Dent's guilt. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 



















arrest silence was not submitted to jury for purpose of implying guilt). Rather 
than attempting to carry this burden by pointing to specific facts in the record that 
would demonstrate the complained of testimony was used for this improper 
purpose, Dent simply argues the testimony elicited by the prosecutor in this case 
was similar to that found improper in Ellington and Parker and, therefore, 
amounted to a clear violation of her constitutional rights. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-
6.) A comparison of the facts of Ellington and Parker to the facts of this case 
shows Dent's arguments are without merit. 
In Ellington, the Idaho Supreme Court held the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting testimony from a detective that, after Ellington was placed 
under arrest, the detective "attempted" to interview him. 151 Idaho at 59-61, 253 
P.3d at 733-35. In concluding the prosecutor's questions and the detective's 
testimony amounted to an impermissible comment on Ellington's post-arrest 
silence, the Court reasoned: 
[l]t is unclear what the prosecutor's line of questioning regarding 
the fact that Mr. Ellington was not interviewed at that time was 
being used to establish. However, the jury was likely to infer that 
the reason Sergeant Maskell only "attempted" to interview Mr. 
Ellington rather than actually interviewing him was because he 
chose to invoke his right to remain silent once he was put under 
arrest. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61, 253 P.3d at 735. Because the relevance of the 
prosecutor's line of inquiry was neither apparent from the record nor satisfactorily 
explained by the state on appeal, the Court in Ellington concluded "[t]he fact that 
Mr. Ellington was not interviewed by the police was simply unnecessary 




















Ellington's post-arrest silence." ~ The Court further concluded that, even if the 
prosecutor did not deliberately solicit the offending testimony, the testimony 
would nevertheless be imputed to the state because the officer, as a 
representative of the state, "had the same duty as the prosecutor not to 
improperly comment on Mr. Ellington's silence." ~ Finally, the Court observed 
"there was absolutely no reason for the prosecutor to engage in this line of 
questioning in the first place, particularly given that he clearly knew the line of 
questioning would create a high risk of an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's 
silence" and, therefore, the Court held "there was misconduct." ~ 
In Parker, the defendant complained about testimony from a detective that 
was given in response to the prosecutor's question about how the detective's 
interview with the detective ended. That testimony was: 
As I was talking to him about these things, he said, "I'm done." And 
since I had promised him that he could leave whenever he wished 
to leave, I took that as a sign that he did not want to talk to us any 
more [sic]. So I talked to him for just a minute to make sure he was 
okay, and then I allowed him to leave. 
Parker, 157 Idaho at_, 334 P.3d at 821 ("[sic]" in original).) 
The Idaho Supreme Court found the foregoing testimony improper and 
concluded the prosecutor's "line of questioning ... appear[ed] to have been 
used solely for the purpose of informing the jury that Parker invoked his right to 
silence after Detective Smith" confronted him about the victim's sexual abuse 
allegations. ~ The Court also noted that the state "provide[d] absolutely no 



















interview terminated" or "offer any explanation for the relevancy of the interview's 
termination." ~ 
Unlike the line of questioning and testimony at issue in Ellington and 
Parker, the line of questioning and testimony at issue in this case was neither 
intended to imply Dent's guilt from her silence, nor did it clearly have the effect of 
doing so. The prosecutor asked Officer Woodward about the baggies of 
methamphetamine because that, along with Dent's behavior, which indicated she 
was under the influence of methamphetamine, was the basis for Dent's arrest. 
(See Trial Tr., p.165, L.4 - p.166, L.12.) Further, as indicated by the first part of 
Officer Woodward's response, Dent did provide a response to her knowledge (or 
lack thereof) regarding the baggies. (Tr., p.165, L.24 - p.166, L.1.) It is 
apparent, however, that the prosecutor's intent was not to imply guilt based on 
Dent's invocation of her right to remain silent as to the baggies because the 
methamphetamine in the baggies was not the basis of the possession charge; 
rather, the basis of the charge was the positive methamphetamine result related 
to the pipe Dent concealed in her vagina about which Dent did not remain silent. 
The prosecutor explained as much in his opening statement: 
You're going to hear from Officer Joel Woodward. And he 
will tell you that what he encountered there at the house gave him 
pause. He'll describe the defendant's behavior. He'll describe the 
condition of the house. And he will tell you that, as they continued 
their walk through the house to ensure that it was safe, in the 
basement, they found baggies, plastic baggies, that appeared to 
Officer Woodward to contain white crystals that he recognized to 
be methamphetamine. 
But that's not why we're here. Officer Woodward will tell you 
that he asked the defendant about them and she said, "I have no 
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go." He'll tell you that he placed the defendant under arrest. Why 
we're here is that after that moment, as he was walking her up the 
stairs, he asked her, "Is there anything on your person that I need 
to know about?" You're going to hear the defendant responded, 
"Yes, there is. I have two meth pipes" - excuse me, "I have two 
pipes in my vagina." 
You're going to hear from Officer Sally Miller of the Nampa 
Police Department who was called to respond because they 
needed a female officer at this point. She will testify that she 
observed the defendant remove two items from her vagina, a pipe 
and a toothbrush. And finally today, you're going to hear from 
Kerry Russell, who is an Idaho State Police chemist. She will tell 
you that she examined the sample that she received, she tested 
the pipe and tested the substance inside it and found that it tested 
positive for methamphetamine. 
(Trial Tr., p.152, L.1 -p.153, L.9.) 
While the officer's testimony is undoubtedly imputed to the state, see 
Ellington, supra, the prosecutor's opening comments support the conclusion that 
Officer Woodward's anticipated testimony did not include Dent's eventual 
invocation of her right to silence in relation to the baggies, and that the charged 
offense was not predicated on what was in the baggies. Moreover, there is no 
danger that the jury actually drew any adverse inference from the fact that, after 
Officer Woodward advised Dent of her right to remain silent, Dent indicated she 
did not want to discuss the baggies because, as to the relevant 
methamphetamine Dent was charged with possessing, Dent did not remain 
silent. As such, Dent has failed to meet her burden of showing a plain violation 
of any constitutional right. 
Even if this Court concludes Dent has met her burden of showing a clear 
constitutional violation, Dent has failed to demonstrate that the alleged error 





















notably that Dent did not remain silent about the paraphernalia concealed in her 
vagina that tested positive for methamphetamine. Dent claims otherwise, 
arguing "there is a reasonable possibility that the jurors harbored a reasonable 
doubt as to whether Ms. Dent was telling the truth about not knowing what was in 
the baggies." (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) This argument fails because it is 
predicated on the jurors' interpretation of Dent's statements regarding the 
baggies, not on any negative inference from her silence. Dent's argument also 
ignores that the possession charge was not based on the methamphetamine in 
the baggies, but was based on the methamphetamine on the pipe from Dent's 
vagina. 
Even though Dent does not acknowledge that the factual basis for the 
charge as argued by the state related to methamphetamine about which Dent 
was not silent, she "recognizes" that the Court in Parker "found no prejudice 
under similar circumstances," but contends the Court's "overwhelming evidence" 
rationale in Parker is "not exactly appropriate" in light of the Court's more recent 
opinion in State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 342 P.3d 628 (2015). (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.8-9.) This argument lacks merit. 
In its harmless error analysis in Parker, the Court stated: 
The jury may have inferred guilt from Parker's silence at the 
termination of [his] interview with detectives, but the jury was 
introduced to . ample evidence of guilt with Parker's own 
incriminating statements made during that same interview. This is 
not a case where the defendant did not answer any questions 
posited by law enforcement and the prosecutor sought to imply 
guilt from the defendant's complete silence or lack of cooperation. 
Any inference of a guilty conscience from Parker's silence did not 




















Parker, 157 Idaho at 334 P.3d at 822 (citations omitted). 
As Dent concedes, the "circumstances" of her case are "similar" to Parker. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Indeed, the similarities are significant. Like Parker, "the 
jury was introduced to ample evidence of guilt with [Dent's] own incriminating 
statements" regarding the methamphetamine pipe in her vagina. Parker, 157 
Idaho at_, 334 P.3d at 822. "This is not a case where [Dent] did not answer 
any questions posited by law enforcement and the prosecutor sought to imply 
guilt from [Dent's] complete silence or lack of cooperation." !st Instead, it was a 
case based upon properly admitted statements made by Dent that she 
possessed a pipe, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. "Any 
inference of a guilty conscience from [Dent's] silence" regarding the baggies, "did 
not affect the outcome of the trial." !st Nothing in Thomas compels a different 
conclusion in this case than the one the Court reached in Parker. 
In Thomas, the Court found that the trial court erred in excluding evidence 
that would have supported the defendant's defense theory. Thomas, 157 Idaho 
at _, 342 P.3d at 631. The Court also rejected the state's contention that, 
even if the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, the error was harmless 
because "the evidence presented during the trial [did] not reasonably support 
Defendant's version of what occurred and that the evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming." !st The Court noted that, "[i]n some instances, a constitutional 
error can be determined to be harmless because of the overwhelming evidence 
of guilt," but the Court found it "must also consider the question asked by the 





















whether there was any evidence to corroborate Defendant's testimony." Id. 
Because the jury asked a question that directly implicated the excluded 
evidence, the Court found the state "failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the constitutional error in excluding the proffered evidence did not 
affect the jury's verdict." ~ 
While the Court in Thomas clearly indicated that there may be other 
information in a case beyond the evidence that may be pertinent to a harmless 
error analysis, Dent has failed to identify any legitimate basis for finding that 
principle applicable to her case. Dent's only argument on this point is that "this 
case reveals the reasonable possibility that the jurors were skeptical of the 
State's case but they abandoned that reasonable doubt because they inferred 
Ms. Dent's guilt from the inappropriate comment on her decision to remain 
silent." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) This argument, however, is based on 
speculation about what she thinks the jurors might have done, not on anything 
that is apparent from the record or even remotely equivalent to the jury question 
in Thomas that the Court felt compelled to consider in deciding whether the error 
was harmless. Dent's claim that Thomas compels a different result than Parker 
with respect to the harmless error analysis fails. 
Considering the evidence presented and the state's theory of the case, 
this Court can easily conclude that any error in relation to Officer Woodward's 
testimony concerning Dent's post-Miranda decision not to discuss the baggies of 






















harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dent has failed to establish fundamental 
error entitling her to reversal of her conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Dent's conviction for possession of methamphetamine. 
DATED this 4th day of May 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of May 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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e ty Attorney General 
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